Dangerous Bernas line -- with Fr. Bernas’s comments

Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 03:09:00 11/20/2010

Filed Under: Churches (organisations), Abortion, Advice, Medicines, Illegal drugs

MAY I thank Fr. Joaquin Bernas for clarifying separation of Church and State and what the State permits under this principle.

I must admit though that I read with dismay this line in his October 18 column: “The moment of conception is popularly understood as the moment of fertilization ... even if medical literature seems to see conception as the moment of implantation.”

This proposition might embolden women to continue using abortifacient contraceptives because, anyway, the embryo is only human according to popular understanding, but not according to medical science, which is the one that decides this question. Viewed together with his proposal for a government budget in support of “artificial methods of family planning,” it sounds like a justification for such use of taxpayer money.

However, the Oxford Medical Dictionary of 2002 defines conception thus: (in gynaecology) the start of pregnancy, when a male germ cell (sperm) fertilizes a female germ cell (ovum) in the Fallopian tube. There is also expert declarations found in: http://clinicquotes.com/site/ story.php?id=28; http://abortionabout.com/ when-does-life-begin.html. Just one example from a medical textbook: “The development of a human begins with fertilization”—Sadler, T.W., “Langman’s Medical Embryology.” The book is described as “Long respected for its scientific authority, pedagogy and clinical relevance to medical education.”

Since Father Bernas is a lawyer, he might also be interested in the US Senate report on the Human Life Statute of 1981: Physicians, biologists and other scientists agree that conception marks the beginning of the life of a human being—a being that is alive and is a member of the human species. There is overwhelming agreement on this point in countless medical, biological and scientific writings. (Senate Judiciary Committee S-158, 97th Congress).

Bernas did try to explain the constitutional basis of the right to life from conception (“the safer approach”) and he wrote that the biological life begun at fertilization will not become human “if it is not already human at fertilization.”

On his suggestion to use taxpayer money for the purchase of contraceptives, kindly study the writings of important social scientists on the destructive consequences of the pill. You can find this in the Net if you Google, say, “The Vindication of Humanae Vitae.”

Also, Edward C. Green, Harvard director for AIDS Prevention, an agnostic, has clearly shown that contraceptives lead to a heightened spread of AIDS. Anti-Catholic Nobel prize winner George Akerlof has shown convincingly that the “Reproductive Technology Shock” brought about by contraceptives has led to more sex outside marriage, fatherless children and abortion.

So I do hope that Bernas would reflect on this letter and modify the “non-scientific statements.” Let me take this opportunity though to express my deep appreciation of all his positive work for human life and his columns clarifying issues that befuddle our country.
—JT U. SAGALO,
jtusagalo@gmail.com

Thank you for your comments. Let me just say two things:
1. My view is that conception in the Constitution means fertilization. Whether this is also the scientific meaning, I leave to medical science.
2. I accept the traditional teaching of the Catholic Church on contraception. I hold, however, that the state cannot impose this view on non-Catholics.
—FR. JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.

Talking Points for Dialogue on the Reproductive Health Bill

(HB 96; filed July 1 , 2010)1
Issued jointly by Loyola School of Theolog
and the John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues
Authors: Fr. Eric O. Genilo, S.J., Fr. John J. Carroll, S.J., and Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J.


Introduction: Need for Critical and Constructive Engagement in the Debate
The polarization of Philippine society over the Reproductive Health Bill has
been a source of discouragement and discontent among Filipinos. It is unfortunate
that the debate has focused only on whether the Bill should be passed or rejected in
its present form. Either option would not be good for Filipinos. The Church sees in
the proposed Bill serious flaws that can lead to violations of human rights and
freedom of conscience. It would not be acceptable to pass it in its present form.
Total rejection of the Bill, however, will not change the status quo of high rates of
infant mortality, maternal deaths, and abortions. It is a moral imperative that such
dehumanizing conditions should not be allowed to continue. What is needed is a
third option: critical and constructive engagement. By working together to
amend the objectionable provisions of the Bill and retain the provisions that
actually improve the lives of Filipinos, both the proponents and opponents of the
Bill can make a contribution to protection of the dignity of Filipinos and an
improvement of their quality of life.
The following are talking points and proposals for dialogue and negotiation
on the objectionable portions of the Bill:
Talking Point # 1: The Protection of Human Life and the Constitution
• The Church insists on protection of human life upon fertilization. The question
to be answered by the State is if this is the same position it will take regarding
the protection of human life.
• The Philippine Constitution says that the State will protect the life of the
unborn upon conception (Art. II, Sec. 12). It is not specified in the Constitution
This version has undergone some editing by Fr. Romeo J. Intengan, S.J., in terms of structuring of the
presentation, medical terminology, typography, style, specification of referents, and citation of sources.
whether conception means fertilization or the implantation of an embryo in the
womb. The Constitutional Convention seemed to favor fertilization. The
definition of conception will have a bearing whether contraceptives that prevent
the implantation of embryos would be legally allowed or not. This definition of
conception in the Constitution must be worked out both by medical and legal
experts in order to determine the parameters of what reproductive services can
be provided by the Bill.
Talking Point # 2: Contraceptives that Prevent the Implantation of Embryos
• At the center of the controversy regarding abortion and the RH Bill are
intrauterine devices (IUDs) and other contraceptive medications and devices
(HB 96, Sec. 4:15; Sec. 7; Sec. 9) that may have the possible effect of
preventing the implantation of an embryo, which for the Catholic Church, is
considered an abortifacient effect. [Contraceptives without abortifacient effects
are treated differently in church teaching. They are forbidden for Catholics.
Some other religious traditions allow them.]
• Proposal: The State first has to make a clear position whether it considers the
prevention of implantation of an embryo as an abortion. If the State takes this
position, there must be a careful and scientifically based evaluation of each of
the medicines and devices provided by the Bill. Those contraceptive medicines
and devices which are determined to have abortifacient effects are to be banned
even now and regardless of whether the RH Bill is passed or not.
Talking Point # 3: Age Appropriate, Value-Based, Integral Human Sexuality
Education
• The mandatory nature of the sexuality education curriculum proposed by the
Bill (HB 96, Sec. 13) is a concern for the Church because it would compel
Catholic educators to teach parts of the curriculum that may be unacceptable for
Catholics. The Church is also concerned that the parents’ right to decide on the
education of their children would be denied by such a mandatory curriculum for
all schools.
• Proposal: For the purpose of protecting academic freedom and respecting
religious traditions, should not the right of religious schools to write and
implement their own sexuality education curriculum according their religious
traditions be respected? For public schools and non-religious private schools, an
appointed panel of parent representatives, educators, experts in child
development and psychology, medical experts, and representatives of religious
traditions can write the sexuality education curriculum and the Department of
Education can monitor the implementation. Parents with children in public
schools should have the right to have their children exempted from the sexuality
education class if the curriculum is not acceptable to them. The Constitution
allows religious instruction in public schools only if the parents consent in
writing. Should a similar provision be enacted relative to sexuality education?
The Bill must also respect the conscientious objection of individual educators
who refuse to teach a sexuality curriculum that violates their religious beliefs.
Talking Point # 4: Providing Reproductive Health Information and Services
for a Multi-Religious Society
• Even if the majority of the population of the country are Catholics, our
democratic system should ensure that public policies are not determined solely
by majority vote but also by a careful consideration of the common good of all,
including non-Catholics.
• The Compendium of the Social Teaching of the Church rejects any imposition
of norms by a majority that is discriminatory of the rights of a minority: (#422)
“Because of its historical and cultural ties to a nation, a religious community
might be given special recognition on the part of the State. Such recognition
must in no way create discrimination within the civil or social order for other
religious groups;” (#169): “Those responsible for government are required to
interpret the common good of their country not only according to the guidelines
of the majority but also according to the effective good of all the members of the
community, including the minority.”
• It is the duty of various religions to teach their faithful and form their
consciences about what their religious tradition allows and prohibits with regard
to family planning. It is the duty of the government to provide correct and
comprehensive information on all non-abortifacient (as defined by law) family
planning methods that are available. Consciences will thus be better equipped to
make informed choices according to their religious traditions.
• Proposal: There can be two separate parallel programs for providing
information and training, one for NFP and another for artificial methods of
family planning (with separate budgets). The separation of the programs will
ensure that NFP will get adequate funding and those trainers who wish to teach
only NFP for religious reasons will not be forced to teach artificial methods.
The conscience of health workers and trainers should be respected. If a Catholic
health worker or trainer conscientiously objects to teaching contraception
methods, he or she should be allowed to teach only NFP methods.
Talking Point # 5: Limits to the Anti-Discrimination Provision
• The current Bill prohibits the refusal of health care services and information
based on a patient’s marital status, gender or sexual orientation, age, religion,
personal circumstances, and nature of work (HB 96, Sec. 22, a, 3).
• Proposal: This provision must have parameters. It should properly address
such questions as the following:
- For example, if a doctor refuses to insert an IUD to a minor who requests for
it, would that be considered age discrimination?
- Should the provision apply equally to both in the public and private health
care providers or shouldn’t private practitioners have more leeway in
practicing their medicine as they see fit?
Talking Point # 6: Employers' Responsibility
• Employers should not be required to provide in their CBAs reproductive health
services of their employees (see HB 96, Sec. 18). To enforce this requirement
would be a violation of the conscience of Catholic employers.
• Proposal: Such a provision is unnecessary because the general Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) medical coverage, which is
mandatory for all employees, provides for such reproductive health services
upon request of the employee. This allows employers with religious objections
to contraceptives or sterilizations to avoid direct formal cooperation in the
provision of such family planning methods to their employees.
Talking Point # 7: Contraception as Essential Medicines in Government
Health Centers and Hospitals
• The Church’s objection to this provision is that it appears to treat pregnancy as
a disease (see HB 96, Sec. 9)..
• Proposal: The question of whether contraceptives are essential medicines
should be resolved by a panel of objective medical experts such as the
Philippine Medical Association. What contraceptives actually prevent diseases?
It would be helpful to be able to present cases where the use of a contraceptive
is a medically indicated treatment for a particular disease or emergency
situation. If some contraceptives are ultimately decided as essential or
emergency medicines that should be stocked in government health centers and
hospitals, no contraceptives with abortifacient effects are to be allowed.
Talking Point # 8: Freedom of Speech
• The Bill’s provision that penalizes malicious disinformation against the
intention and provisions of the Bill (HB 96, Sec. 22 e) is quite unclear as to
what “malicious disinformation” means. This unclarity could result in the
prosecution and legal punishment of those who dissent in good faith and for
reasons that are at least intellectually arguable, from the views and positions of
those who advocate the Bill in its present form, and who publicly express that
dissent.
• Proposal: clear and fair description of “malicious disinformation”: The
Bill’s provision that penalizes malicious disinformation against the intention
and provisions of the Bill should be refined by a clear description of what
constitutes “malicious disinformation,” or failing that, the provision should be
scrapped.
• Proposal: role of major religious traditions in the crafting of implementing
norms: The committee to be in-charge of the Bill's implementing norms should
have representatives from major religious traditions to ensure that the rights of
people of various faiths would be protected.
Epilogue: Respectful Dialogue in a Spirit of Charity
The above proposals are intended to generate constructive and respectful
dialogue leading to concrete actions that would correct the RH Bill. It is hoped that
the parties involved in the RH debate would move away from hard-line positions
and consider negotiations as a more positive step towards working for the good of
all Filipinos, with special consideration for the unborn, the youth, women and
families in difficult circumstances.
Finally, we can turn to the following Christian maxim as our guide in our
search for answers and solutions regarding the RH Bill: “In essentials, unity; in
non-essentials, liberty; and in all things, charity.” For things pertaining to
protecting human life and dignity, we need to come to a consensus for the common
good; for things that can be left to individual decisions without violating human
life and dignity, we need to respect freedom of conscience of every Filipino both
Catholics and non-Catholics; in all our discussions, we need to speak and act with
charity and understanding as members of the same human family and community.

The impact of "scientific misinformation" on other fields:Philosophy, theology, biomedical ethics, public policy

Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D.
Assistant professor of philosophy and bioethics
DeSales School of Theology
Washington, D.C.
"Scientific misinformation" or inaccuracies are problematic within the field
of science itself. However, perhaps few scientists are aware of or concerned
about the possible impact which scientific misinformation apparently has on
several other seemingly unrelated fields - philosophy, theology, biomedical
ethics, and public policy. To demonstrate such an influence, I will take only
one issue currently debated in these other fields - the biological "marker
events of human personhood" during human embryogenesis, and trace the
impact that seemingly contradictory scientific claims have had on the
theoretical structures and practical conclusions of the several interrelated
fields. Concern is expressed about the serious need for more accurate
scientific input into these discussions and issues, and for scientists to help
sort out which scientific data and theories are actually the most accurate
and scientifically acceptable.
Keywords: Scientific misinformation, philosophy, theology, biomedical
ethics, personhood, public policy, professional expertise.
INTRODUCTION
To paraphrase an old addage, "A small error in the beginning leads to a
multitude of errors in the end" (Aristotle, De Coelo, in McKeon, 1941).
Similarly, at times the use of scientific information, e.g., scientific data or
theories, can dramatically impact other fields seemingly far removed from
the scientific community itself. Scholars and public policy developers from
innumerable fields rely on the accuracy and objectivity of the information
developed within and passed on by that scientific community. Today more
than ever, scientific "facts" are often the starting point for, or the major
premise, in the development of theories and arguments in fields other than
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science itself.
When such scientific information is incorrect, highly questionable, or
misapplied even within the field of science, then it becomes problematic. It
becomes scientific "misinformation" instead, expanding inaccuracies,
becoming imbedded within the theoretical structures of those other fields,
and possibly misguiding public policy officials who rely on scientific
experts.
The aim of this paper** is to suggest to the scientific community the
theoretical and practical consequences of such scientific misinformation on
the fields of philosophy, theology, biomedical ethics and public policy.
The method will be to take only one major current issue, which has its
source in scientific data and argumentation, and trace the impact of that
scientific "misinformation" on those other fields. To narrow the issue I will
trace scientific misinformation concerning human embryogenesis -
specfically, exactly when, during human embryogenesis, is there present a
human being or a human person?
I want to emphasize that this paper is not about describing methods of data
auditing (although, it would support the need for such important
procedures). Nor is it about proving or disproving when fetal "personhood"
takes place. That issue has already been discussed at great length in the
references provided. Rather, regardless of one's own position on fetal
personhood, the aim of this paper is to identify the science actually used in
these arguments, consider the apparent contradiction of this science with
that stated by other scientists, and trace the impact of the science actually
used on the theories of other fields.
In addition, since the philosophy and the science used in the arguments of
fetal "personhood" are often complexly intertwined, I will resort, at times, to
clarifying at least some general philosophical concepts in order to make the
scientific problems inherent in these arguments coherent. Because most of
the arguments are in fact drawn from writers who cross interdiscplinary
lines, the categories of "philosophy," "theology," "biomedical ethics" and
"public policy" can only be roughly drawn. The point is to see how
scientific data and arguments stated by scientists find their way into current
arguments in those others fields.
IMPACT ON OTHER FIELDS
I. Philosophy/Theology/Biomedical Ethics: "Early" Embryonic and Fetal
Development
The field of philosophy is difficult to define. Unlike science or mathematics,
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there is no general agreement on what its subject matter is, or on its
methodology. It is agreed - at least by those philosophers who have studied
the whole history of philosophy - that there are many different schools of
philosophy, each characterized by certain different basic presuppositions
and explanations of the world. The philosophy of science is no exception.
As in all other sub-fields of philosophy, the philosophy of science embraces
all of the very different and often contradictory schools of thought, such as
monism, dualism, rationalism, empiricism, scholasticism and realism. Even
these very terms are defined differently by different schools. There is, then,
no such thing as a "neutral" philosophy, a "neutral" ethics," or even a
"neutral" logic.
For most realistic schools of philosophy, to which this writer subscribes, it is
critical to obtain the most accurate scientific data and theories about the
physical world as is possible, as these scientific facts and theories are the
starting points for all other philosophical endeavors. There are many
important technical philosophical terms whose definitions are derived from
and refined by scientific data - even for example, the seemingly vague
philosophical term "being." For present purposes, a "being," generally
speaking, is a subsistent substance of a particular kind whose nature
determines its kind, and causes certain specific kinds of functions and
activities. There are many different natures or kinds of beings, and thus
many different specific kinds of functions and activities. For example, fish
can swim but trees cannot; frogs produce frog enzymes and proteins, but
tomato plants or giraffes cannot. A being also sustains typical secondary or
accidental modifications. For example, a mushroom is a particular kind of
plant-being; and it can be modified accidentally by being white or black,
small or large, edible or poisonous. Again, a horse is a certain kind of
animal-being; and it can be modified accidentally by being of a solid color
or spotted, roan or bay, short or tall. Mushrooms and horses are examples of
substances or beings. White, black, edible, poisonous, spotted, roan and tall
are examples of accidental modifications of those beings. Changes in
accidental modifications do not change the nature or kind of being it already
is. (For example, an apple can change from green to red, but it is still an
apple).
Not only do scientific observations of the world lead us to specific
definitions of each of the many different natures or kinds of material beings
in the world; they can also lead to analogous definitions of properties which
are "common" to all beings whatsoever. All of these definitions should
"match" as closely as possible that scientific data from which they were
drawn - otherwise we are not theorizing about the real world at all (Irving,
1992). Obviously, if there is an error in the scientific observations or data,
then our concepts about the real world, which are drawn from and represent
to us those scientific observations, are in error as well. A realist's
philosophical concepts and theories, then, must match the best and most
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accurate scientific data and theories about the real world.
Another general technical philosophical term whose definition is impacted
by scientific data is the term "individual." Speaking generally an
"individual" is that which is essentially unified, and one with, or the same
as, itself. For example, a horse is an individual being; a herd of horses are
many individual beings. In contrast to the "accidental" modifications above,
"individuality" is such a "common" technical term defining an essential and
non-accidental attribute of a being. That is, a being cannot be a being unless
it is "one" being. Needless to say, if the definition of "being" is incorrect, the
definitions of "human being" and "material being" are also incorrect - and
the definitions of "ethics" and of "science" will be incorrect as well.
To the point, two other philosophical terms have recently been affected by
the scientific evidence presented in the literature - the terms "human being"
and "human person." Many articles have been written addressing the
question of when during human embryogenesis is there present a human
being? And is a human being the same as a human person - or does a human
person come later in human embryogenesis than a human being?
For purposes of laying out how others have addressed the issue, and to
provide several references to which one might turn to obtain a more detailed
treatment of the arguments, some writers will use scientific information to
argue that a human being is simultaneously a human person - they cannot be
separated (Lejeune, 1989; Irving, 1991, 1992; Fisher, 1991; Ashley, 1987;
Klubertanz, 1953; Carberry and Kmiec, 1992; Howsepian, 1992;
Moraczewski, 1983; Barry, 1979; Daly, 1987; Werner, 1974; Wertheimer,
1971; Brody, 1978; Santamaria, 1982; Grisez, 1970; Iglesias, 1984; Quinn,
1984; Commonwealth of Australia, 1985; Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, 1986; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1987).
Their arguments claim that functionally, genetically and biochemically it is
clear that a new unique living individual human being, who simultaneously
is a human person, is present at some point during fertilization, at least by
the point in fertilization called "symgamy" - that moment in time and space
during the process of fertilization when there is the last crossing-over of the
maternal and paternal chromosomes. It is at that moment when substantial
change has taken place. That is, when the "23" chromosomes of the human
ovum and the "23" chromosomes of the human sperm have combined to
form a human zygote with "46" chromosomes (generally the number and
combination of the human species) then a change in natures has taken place.
The nature of the sperm and the nature of the ovum have changed to the
nature of the embryo - as one can determine scientifically by the differences
in biochemical and biological functions and activities of the sperm, egg, and
zygote. Certain realistic philosophical schools of thought, which always use
the scientific facts as their starting points in conceptualizing the real world,
are often evoked which seem to "match" this biological data. This data
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grounds the argument that from the moment of syngamy there already exists
an individual human being with the "potency" (or nature) to develop
continuously through the later stages of human embryogenesis and
adulthood. Thus embryological development - in contrast to fertilization - is
identified as an example of accidental change - the nature does not change
but the accidents do (Irving, 1991, 1992; Klubertanz, 1953).
"Potency" is a realist philosophical term used to designate an already
existing nature of a particular kind of thing which already has the present
capacity or power to direct the development of itself throughout its
accidental developmental stages. In current discussions this term is
constantly corrupted and construed to mean "potential" or "possibility,"
implying that the nature in question is not there yet, but might be there
sometime in the future. For purposes of correctly understanding the realist
argument on fetal personhood, it is critical that these three terms -
"potency," "potential," and "possible" - are correctly defined, understood
and not equated. A human being with a human nature or potency is already a
human being with a human nature. It is not a "potential" human being
somewhere down the line. And it is not a "possible" human being such as in
the case when the woman decides not to abort, or the IVF technician decides
to implant it). As with accidental change, external circumstances do not
change the very nature which is already possessed by a thing.
Unlike several other philosophical schools of thought, this realistic
philosophical argument formally defines a human being as including human
matter and human powers in that definition. It thus rejects any real split
between a human being and a human person. A "person" is part and parcel
of the whole complex, concrete human being - including the human body.
"Rational attributes" are descriptive of only one of many integrated powers
of that human being. Further, the "soul" is not a thing or substance on its
own; nor does it reside in the brain, or the heart, but in every part of the
whole embodied human being. It understands that "personhood" as defined
by other philosophical systems confuses "person" with "personality"; that it
is theoretically indefensible and leads to rather startling conclusions (Irving,
1991, 1992; Doran, 1989; Wilhelmsen, 1963; Barry, 1979).
Yet other scientific arguments are presented in which real existential
distinctions are variously made between a human organism, a human being
or a human person (Hare, 1988; Buckle, 1990; Dawson, 1990-A, 1990-B;
Bedate and Cefalo, 1989; Suarez, 1990; Bole, 1989, 1990; Grobstein, 1985;
McCormick, 1990; Ford, 1988; Coughlin, 1988, 1989; Wallace, 1989;
Lockwood, 1988; Jones, 1989; Sass, 1989; Singer, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1989;
Kuhse, 1985, 1986; Engelhardt, 1985; Goldenring, 1982, 1985; Kushner,
1984; Shea, 1985; Tooley, 1974; Tauer, 1985; Bennett, 1989).
For example, it is argued that at some embryological "marker event" post
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fertilization a human "person" is present; before that time there is only a
human "being" present (at best). Bedate and Cefalo, for example, have
submitted sophisticated scientific arguments that at fertilization there is not
even a genetic individual present, much less a human being; "personhood" is
not present until at least 14 days. Others (Grobstein and McCormick) have
argued scientifically that at fertilization there is present a "genetic"
individual - but that "genetic" individuality is not sufficient for the presence
of an individual human "person." What is also needed, they argue, is the
presence of a "developmental" individual, and that does not take place until
about 14 days. Only a "developmental" individual can be a human "person."
If a writer is arguing scientifically for any kind of a real existential
distinction between a human being and a human person, it should be pointed
out that that science contains very specific philosophical presuppositions
like scholasticism, dualism, rationalism, or empiricism. For example, any
real distinctions empirically made between a human being and a human
person contain what is known in philosophical anthropology as a
"mind/body split" - an historical remnant of a Platonic/Cartesean dualism
grounded in a very rationalistic school of philosophy. I will not go into the
fascinating historical interplay between the reciprocal conceptual impact of
philosophy and empirical science, although many have treated this matter
elsewhere (Irving, 1991, 1992; Gilson, 1949; Crombie, 1959). Nor will I
elaborate on the history or the disasterous consequences of the theoretical
problems inherent in a scholastic, rationalistic, empiricist or dualistic
mind/body split in philosophy (Irving, 1992; Fox, 1989; Doran, 1989;
Gilson, 1963; Eslick, 1963; Coppleston, 1963; Wilhelmsen, 1956;
Meilaender, 1987, 1989). Suffice it to say that philosophically a mind/body
split implies the presence of not one but rather two or more independent
substances which go to make up a single human being (or a single human
person). One of a number of the theoretical problems is, of course, that if
these substances are really in fact separate and independent, absolutely no
interaction is possible between them. There is literally no way that so-called
"rational attributes" (consciousness, self-consciousness, autonomy, relating
with the world around one, desiring, willing, loving, hating, etc.) can
concretely connect with the physical "body" which is supposed to be
supporting such "rational attributes." Virtually all of the writers I will
address in this paper do make such a distinction between a human being and
a human person - most of them based on these types of theories of
philosophy (whether acknowledged or not).
It might be curious to scientists to see where such a rationalistic philosophy
takes one even in the field of science itself. For example, historically, one of
the major philosophical sources of a mind/body split was Rene Decartes -
who was both a scientist (physicist) and a philosopher. Descartes (Edwards,
1967) defined a human being as composed of two independent substances -
"Mind" and "Body" (or "Extension"). Ultimately he defined a human being
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as "a thinking thing" - thus one source of the so-called "rational attributes"
used in many of the arguments I will address below.
Descartes also defined the material world in terms of only one of those two
substances, i.e., "extension." Because of this definition of the material
world, and because he rejected the existence of a void, Descartes'
philosophical theories impacted mischieviously on his own theory of
physics and his ability to even do science. For example, because he rejected
the existence of a void, the material substance of the world was therefore
continuous. This had serious consequences in his scientific theory of the
vortex. The material world is not composed of ultimate atoms, but only of
volumes, which must then move as a whole, i.e., a simultaneous movement
of matter in some closed curve. Planetary motion, then, is defined as one
infinite three-dimensional continuous and homogenous extended body.
If there is only one continuous extended substance, then he can only
distinguish one body from another body in terms of differential volumes and
secondary qualities. Therefore he cannot have a definition for density, or for
viscosity. Descartes also omits "matter" from his definition of motion.
Motion = speed x size - but "size" for Descartes is a continuous volume of
body. Therefore his own physical Laws of Impact are actually, empirically,
in error. He also cannot isolate a particular force (like gravity) in terms of
how a body would move if it were free from resistence, because to imagine
it moving without resistance is to imagine it in a void - the existence of
which he had rejected.
Also, Descartes concluded (based, again, on his theory of "being," or
"substance") that animals have no minds, no pineal glands (the physical
organ in humans where somehow, unexplicably, the Mind and the Body are
capable of interacting), and no souls. Therefore they cannot feel any pain or
pleasure, or any other kinds of sensations (sensations were only mental
"modes of thought"). Since animals are only bodies, i.e., "machines," the
only sense in which they can be hurt is to "damage" them.
This rationalistic philosophical system was eventually discredited and
discarded by most of the scholarly community - yet, incredibly, remnants of
it remain today. I would argue that such a rationalistic philosophical system
contains such severe theoretical problems that it actually precludes one from
doing either philosophy or science. And if applied to the current issue of
human embryogenesis, it is clear that such a "theory" is grossly inadequate
to explain either the philosophical theories or the biological phemonena
which need to be addressed. It is clear that one cannot explain any
interactions between the mind (or "soul"), and the body (or brain) of the
developing human being -since they are two different substances which are
separate from each other. There can be no connection between those
"rational attributes" and the "body" (or brain). Nor can it explain the
8
complex mechanisms of motion involved in the genetics, biochemistry and
organogenesis so characteristic of human embryological development. Nor
can the embryo's or fetus' body be distinctively its own, but must be shared
quantitatively with the rest of the material world. Needless to say, however,
this rationalistic philosophical theory is still used - often as paired with
apparently erroneous scientific "data" - as demonstrated in many of the
articles below.
Bedate and Cefalo: Using genetics and molecular biology, Bedate and
Cefalo claim that there are erroneous empirical presuppositions in the
"fertilization argument." Specifically they claim that the human zygote does
not contain all of the information necessary to produce the specific
biological character of the future adult (Bedate and Cefalo, 1989). Although
their arguments contain major logical, philosophical and scientific problems
(Irving, 1991), I give only two examples which are particularly misleading
conceptually as well as empirically incorrect.
The development of the human zygote, they claim, depends on:
1. the actualization of pieces of information that originate de novo during
the embryonic process - "positional information." In support of this claim
they produce the following scientific facts. The human zygote does possess
some of its own genetically coded information but not all of the molecular
information needed for embryological development. Some information is
given in time through interaction with other molecules which were not
coded in the genome.
2. exogenous information which is independent of the control of the zygote,
- molecular information from the mother. In support of this claim they state
that information about differentiation does not exist in the original genome.
The human zygote contains only enough genetic information to proceed
through the blastocyst stage, and does not contain the information for the
process of differentiation. Rather, the information for the process of
differentiation is determined and derived by an exchange of information
originating in the mother. There would seem to be several problems with
their first claim. First, there is an equivocal and misleading shift in their use
of the critically important term "information." "Information" can mean
genetic information, or molecular ("positional") information. The
fertilization argument is not a claim that virtually all of the information -
genetic as well as molecular - is present at fertilization. Neither at
fertilization nor at the age of 45 years do any of us contain all of the
molecular or positional information we will ever have. But that is not the
point. At fertilization a human zygote does contain virtually all of the
genetic information the human being ever will possess. No new genetic
information is gained during embryogenesis - and none is lost. As Jerome
Lejeune, the internationally recognized developmental geneticist, has put it
9
for the non-scientific audience:
...each of us has a unique beginning, the moment of conception... As soon as
the twenty-three chromosomes carried by the sperm encounter the twentythree
chromosomes carried by the ovum, the whole information necessary
and sufficient to spell out all the characteristics of the new being is
gathered... (W)hen this information carried by the sperm and by the ovum
has encountered each other, then a new human being is defined which has
never occurred before and will never occur again... [the zygote, and the cells
produced in the succeeding divisions] is not just simply a non-descript cell,
or a "population" or loose "collection" of cells, but a very specialized
individual, i.e., someone who will build himself [i.e., possesses the nature or
potency] according to his own rule. (Lejeune, 1989) (emphasis added)
Lejeune's description is likewise expressed in more scientific terms in
virtually all embryology and genetic text books known to this writer.
Second, this original genetic information in the human zygote will itself
specifically direct the formation of virtually all of the molecular or
"positional" information necessary for the continuous development of the
human zygote to the human adult. This is explained empirically in part by
the process of methylation, a process which is itself encoded in the original
genetic information of the human zygote. Methylation is one factor which
explains why some genes are "silenced" and other genes are "turned on"
during development (Lejeune, 1989), producing what Lewin describes as a
process of "information cascading" (Lewin, 1983; Emery, 1983). These
processes - which continue into adulthood - help to explain both genetic as
well as molecular levels of developmental control.
In describing the process of cascading, Lewin explains how information is
transmitted from the human zygote to virtually all of the later stages of
development:
"We view the development of an adult organism from a fertilized egg as
following a predetermined pathway, in which specific genes are turned on
and off at specific times... (W)e see that the product of one gene may control
another gene. A cascade of control ensues when a series of such events are
connected so that the gene turned on (or off) at one stage itself controls
expression of other genes at the next stage" (Lewin, 1983). (emphasis
added)
In addition to gene control, cascading also accounts for molecular control.
For example, Lewin states, products of genetic instruction, such as protein
molecules, carry within themselves certain "instructions" by virtue of the
kind of molecules they are. Thus proteins exhibit a diversity of forms. There
are primary, secondary and tertiary forms of a protein. There is also, we
10
know, a relationship between the structure of a protein and the way it
functions (Lewin, 1983). How do these different conformations of a protein
come about?
As Lewin further explains in his text, it is a "fundamental principle that
higher-order structures are determined directly by the lower-order structures.
This means that the primary sequence of amino acids carries the information
for folding into the correct conformation." And this control continues in a
"sequential folding mechanism" through the higher-order levels of
organization. "All the information necessary to form the secondary
structures resides in the primary structure" of the protein. And the primary
structure of the protein is determined by the genetic information in the cell.
Lewin continues that the "structural, catalytic, and regulatory activities of
the proteins of a cell are responsible, directly or indirectly, for creating its
ultrastructure and interconverting the small molecules... Obeying the laws of
physics and chemistry, together these macromolecules are responsible for
the survival of living cells (Lewin, 1983).
Thus - if this scientific account is correct - the claims of the fertilization
argument would seem to be correct, and Bedate and Cefalo's scientific
claims would seem to be incorrect. All of the genetic information is present
at fertilization which is needed to produce the specific biological character
of the future adult, including specifically human "positional" molecules, as
well as specifically human tissue and organ systems. This genetic
information controls both genetic and molecular information which
"cascades" throughout all of a human being's development. Later
"positional" molecules, reactions and organ formations of the developing
human being are not random or independent of the human zygote's genetic
content and structure, but are ultimately generated, controlled and coded by
that very genetic information present in the original human zygote.
Bedate and Cefalo's second argument, that the development of the human
zygote depends on "exogenous" information from the mother which is
independent of the control of the human zygote, is likewise conceptually
misleading and, it would seem, scientifically incorrect. First, I again point
out their equivocal use of the term "information." Their argument is about
molecular information - not genetic information. And, as implied above,
even the use of exogenous "positional" information is pre-determined by the
genetic information in the original human zygote. Second, their claims that
the human zygote only contains enough of its own genetic information to
proceed through the blastocyst stage, and that the process of differentiation
is not coded in the genetic information in the human zygote but rather is
determined by "information" from the mother also seems to be scientifically
incorrect. It would appear clear from Lejeune, Lewin, Emery and most other
well-established and respected scientific authorities that the original human
zygote does indeed contain all of the genetic information needed for all of
11
the processes of human development - including those of cleavage, cell
differentiation, and implantation. Furthermore, there are many recent
experiments, especially those involving transgenic mice, which would refute
Bedate and Cefalo's empirical claim that the process of differentiation is
determined by the mother (Mavilio, 1986; Hart, 1985; and Holtzer, 1985;
see also Suarez, 1990; Szulmann, 1978; Moore, 1982; Wimmers, 1988;
Lawler, 1987; Martin, 1980; Alberts, 1983).
Also, it would seem that Bedate and Cefalo's claim about the source of the
information for differentiation is closely connected to another error, i.e., a
misconception about human "development." Their implication is that human
development is somehow informationally and physically discontinuous. It
would seem that human development is controlled essentially at one time by
"information" from the zygote, embryo or fetus, and at another time by
"information" from outside and independent of the developing human being.
But the most reliable scientific sources indicated above claim that the
essential nature and genetic information of the product of fertilization, i.e.,
the human zygote, itself determines continuously the essential course of
human development. Exogenous molecules contribute only accidentally.
There is, scientifically, no controlling informational or physiological break
from the original human zygote during all of human development.
Thus, according to this science, the human zygote is by nature and by
definition a human being, possessing "46" chromosomes and the active
genetic capacity (including mitochondrial DNA) to change itself over time
in accidental - not essential - ways. There is no biological, genetic or
informational break in this developmental continuum. Exogenous molecular
information - even from the mother - does not actually change the very
nature of the developing human being, i.e., change it from one kind of thing
into another kind of thing. Empirically we know that that is not what
happens -all we have to do is look at the number and kinds of chromosomes
present from the beginning and throughout human development. An embryo
does not have the number and kinds of chromosomes as a tomato plant; nor
does the fetus have those of a giraffe. Maternal molecules do not determine
the very nature of the developing human being nor the nature of its
processes. Maternal molecules are only used in non-essential accidental
processes of human development; and that use is itself dictated ultimately by
the genetic and molecular information in the human zygote, embryo or fetus.
There is also the implication by Bedate and Cefalo that "development" is
restricted to the embryonic and fetal stages. But unrefuted work by the
embryologist Moore - among many others - would reject such speculations
concerning this and the above points. Unless the text books of Moore,
Lewin, Emory and other well-known and generally accepted and
acknowledged scientists, as well as multiple recent works in journal
publications, are grossly incorrect, the most accurate and reliable description
12
of embryological development is as follows (and I quote from Moore):
Human development is a continuous process that begins when an ovum
from a female is fertilized by a sperm from a male. Growth and
differentiation transform the zygote, a single cell formed by the union of the
ovum and the sperm, into a multicellular adult human being. Most
developmental changes occur during the embryonic and the fetal periods,
but important changes also occur during the other periods of development:
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood... Although it is customary to divide
development into prenatal and postnatal periods, it is important to realize
that birth is merely a dramatic event during development resulting in a
distinct change in environment. Development does not stop at birth:
important developmental changes, in addition to growth, occur after birth...
Most developmental changes are completed by the age of 25. (Moore, 1982,
p. 1) (emphasis added)
And finally, Bedate and Cefalo have argued that the developing entity is not
predetermined to give rise to a human being, since it can give rise to
biological entities that are not human beings, i.e., hydatidiform moles and
teratomas. However, as Suarez (1990) correctly points out, the empirical
implication in that argument is that hydatidiform moles and teratomas
develop from biologically normal embryos - but that scientific implication is
apparently scientifically incorrect.
As Suarez argues, hydatidiform moles do not develop from something
which is normal, but from biological entities which carry gross
chromosomal aberrations, and thus possess no capacity at all to function
biologically as a human being or to develop into normal human beings.
Hydatidiform moles of the complete type (CHM) arise from androgenic
eggs (i.e., eggs with two paternal nuclei). The usual mechanism is the fusion
of an egg and sperm followed by duplication of the sperm genome and loss
of the female nucleus. Sometimes the mechanism is due to dispermy (i.e.,
two sperms enter the egg at fertilization) with the loss of the female nucleus.
Either way, Suarez explains, hydatidiform moles do not originate from
normal human embryos, but rather from entities containing either no
maternal chromosomes or from entities containing two paternal
chromosomes.
Suarez also points out that ovarian (gynogenic) teratomas can arise from
parthenogenesis. That is, without fertilization by a sperm, an egg in the
ovary can cleave spontaneously, and progress to form a morula and then a
blastocyst. But it then becomes disorganized and divides into a tumor. Male
(androgenic) teratomas can arise spontaneously from only the male germ
cells in the testes. The empirical point is that in neither the case of the
formation of a hydatidiform mole nor of a teratoma did these biological
13
entities arise from a genetically normal human embryo to begin with.
Grobstein and McCormick: These writers (Grobstein, 1985; McCormick,
1990) argue that a human person can be present only if there is a
"developmental" individual, rather than simply a "genetic" individual. The
5-6 day stage of embryological development is significant for them because
at this point they claim that they can demonstrate scientifically the presence
of "only a genetic individual" (i.e., not a "developmental" individual) - a
non-person. They will term this entity a "pre-embryo," implying it is a "preindividual,"
or a "pre-human being."
These writers state that at the 5-6 day stage, two cell layers are formed - the
trophoblast or outer cell layer, and the blastocyst or inner cell layer.
McCormick, following Grobstein, makes this empirical argument:
I contend in this paper that the moral status - and specifically the
controversial issue of personhood - is related to the attainment of
developmental individuality (being the source of one individual)... It should
be noted that at the zygote stage the genetic individual is not yet
developmentally single - a source of only one individual. As we will see,
that does not occur until a single body axis has begun to form, near the end
of the second week post fertilization when implantation is underway.
(McCormick, 1990) (emphasis added)
These early cells, they claim, are really only "loose collections" of
undifferentiated, "totipotent" cells, and they name them, or designate them
collectively, as only comprising a "pre-embryo" (a term which is not used
by other embryologists, but only by philosophers, theologians and
bioethicists).
The scientific facts which they give to support these claims are the
following. They state that only the cells from the inner layer, the blastocyst,
eventually become the adult human being. The cells from the trophoblast
layer, they write, are all discarded after birth as the sac and the umbilical
cord, etc. Thus, developmentally, the implication is that we are not dealing
with a developmental individual, or only with those important cells which
will become the adult human being, i.e., the blastocyst, but rather a mixture
of "essential" (blastocyst) and "non-essential" (trophoblast - will all be
discarded after birth) cells, i.e., a PRE-embryo. A pre-embryo, then, is not a
human being or a human person, yet:
This multicellular entity, called a blastocyst, has an outer cellular wall, a
central fluid-filled cavity and a small gathering of cells at one end known as
the inner cell mass. Developmental studies show that the cells of the outer
wall become the trophoblast (feeding layer) and are precursors to the later
placenta. Ultimately, all these cells are discarded at birth. (emphasis added)
14
These scientific facts would seem to be incorrect, and would necessarily
lead to incorrect philosophical concepts, as well as erroneous ethical
judgments. It is scientifically incorrect to state that all of the cells from the
trophoblast layer are discarded after birth. As can be found in virtually all
embryology texts, including Moore's text from which they quote, many of
the cells from this trophoblast layer become an integral and essential part of
the constitution of the fetus, newborn and adult human being. For example,
the cells from the trophoblast layer known as the yolk sac cells become part
of the adult gut. And cells known as the allantois cells become part of the
adult ligaments, blood cells and urinary bladder (Moore, 1982; Chada, 1986;
Migliaccio, 1986). Unless these latter sceintists are incorrect, empirically
these claims by Grobstein and McCormick cannot be scientifically
sustained, since many of the cells from the trophoblast layer are
developmentally and genetically continuous with the adult human being.
The 5-6 day stage human embryo, then, is both genetically and
developmentally individual and one with the future human adult. It would
seem that their term "pre-embryo" and what it implies can not be sustained
with the scientific information which they have stated to support their claim.
It would also seem that the moral status to which they refer should be the
same for the 5-6 day embryo as the adult - since they are both
developmentally individuals and in fact are literally the same individual
organism at different accidental stages of development.
It is interesting that they agree that the early cells up to the 14 day stage (the
"pre-embryo") do comprise an "individual" - albeit, only a "genetic"
individual. Why does this "genetic" individuality not suffice for
characterizing it as a "being" or substance? They simply posit that before a
human "being" can become a human "person," it must be the source of only
one individual, and developmentally that "oneness," they say, is not
guaranteed until after 14 days.
But why should "being the source of only one individual" be such a critical
criteria for moral status? One could argue that first there is one individual
worthy of moral status, and if twins or triplets result later, then there are two
or three individuals worthy of moral status. If it is an individual, it is an
individual. Also, since virtually all of the "developmental" stages are normal
processes programmed by the genetic information in the original human
zygote, what would make the developmental stage of "implantation" (which
they designate as that stage where the developing human embryo can now
be "the source of only one individual") any more significant than any other
developmental stage? Indeed, as others will argue below, why not call the
developmental stages of "sentience" or of "whole brain integration" the
morally relevant stage? Others have argued convincingly against
McCormick's and Grobstein's interpretation of and arguments for such a
concept of "developmental" individuality (Fisher, 1991; Howsepian, 1992).
15
But empirically, is implantation really in fact such a definitive
developmental stage such as to preclude "the source of more than one
individual"?
Grobstein and McCormick will provide more scientific evidence in order to
ground their claim that at 14 days a "developmental" individual, i.e., a
person, is finally present. It is impossible, they claim, for a human person to
be present until at least the 14 day marker event (implantation), at which
point the primitive streak forms in the embryo. The philosophical
significance of this marker, they state, is that until the formation of the
primitive streak it is possible for twinning to take place. The totipotent cells
"do not yet know whether to be one or two individuals." After 14 days, they
claim, twinning is not possible, and thus the organism is finally
determinantly one individual - an essential pre-requisite for "personhood"
(McCormick, 1990).
But again this science seems to be incorrect. As Karen Dawson (1990) and
Moore (1982) point out in these debates - and as is found in every human
genetics textbook (unless they are wrong) - it is possible for monozygotic
twinning to take place after 14 days and the formation of the primitive
streak. For example, fetus-in-fetu twins can be formed up to 2 and 3 months
after fertilization, and Siamese twins even later. It is also known that
"twinning" is sometimes genetically determined and coded in the original
single-cell human zygote (as, indeed, is totipotency, differentiation and
implantation).
And is it empirically true that these totipotent cells "do not yet know
whether to be one or two individuals" yet? Is it that they are traumatically so
"undecided"? Of course if a totipotent cell is teased apart (mechanically or
from natural circumstances) from the early developing human being, it can
develop into an adult-stage human being. But this phenomenon is normal!
That is, totipotency is programmed into the single-cell human zygote just as
all of the characteristically human developmental stages are. According to
nature, during totipotency these cells are supposed to be totipotent. It would
not seem to have anything to do with these cells being somehow
"unnatural," "unhuman" or confused and undecided.
Thus Grobstein and McCormick's scientific claims to ground both the
presence of a pre-human, pre-person, pre-developmental "pre-embryo" at 5-
6 days, as well as a 14 day implantation stage of "personhood," seem to be
scientifically incorrect. And so also must their philosophical and moral
claims about individuality and "personhood" which are grounded on the
science they used to support their claims.
Just as empirical data can impact on philosophical concepts and moral
judgments, such philosophical concepts and judgments (containing scientific
16
statements) can impact on theology. Specifically, many theologians require
"individuality" as a prerequisite for "ensoulment." Such, in fact is the case
with McCormick. In what follows I will address several other theologians
whose concepts and arguments for ensoulment have been grounded in what
seems to be incorrect scientific facts.
Suarez (1990), for example, argues that ensoulment must take place at the 2-
cell stage, when there is the completion of the first cell division, as well as
the completion of the genetic input. However, we know scientifically that
the completion of the genetic input is at the single-cell zygote stage, and that
that genetic imput is what directs cell division to begin with. Thus, based on
these scientific facts, Suarez should be arguing for ensoulment at the zygote
stage, rather than at the 2-cell stage.
Ford: Based on the science of Grobstein and McCormick, Ford (1988) also
argues for ensoulment at the 14 day stage (although, before the advent of
Grobstein and McCormick's scientific arguments, Ford had argued for
ensoulment at fertilization - Ford, 1987). Before 14 days, Ford explains,
there is only a biological individual; after 14 days there is an "ontological"
individual, i.e., when differentiation is completed and there is a "distinct
individuality." But aside from the apparent problems with the science of
Grobstein and McCormick, as well as their conclusions about
"individuality," we know scientifically that complete differentiation does not
actually take place until well after birth (Moore, 1982). Certainly a 14 day
embryo is definitely not completely differentiated.
Bole: Bole (1989, 1990), contra Suarez, accepts the scientific data as offered
by Bedate and Cefalo. He agrees that the zygote is not yet an individual, is
not specifically human, and is not responsible for developmental or
differential information. He also accepts their conclusion that the human
zygote cannot be a human being, and therefore it cannot be a human person.
Thus he makes a distinction between a mere "biologically integrated whole"
(a non-person) and a "psychologically integrated whole" (a person).
Ensoulment, for Bole, cannot take place until there is an appropriately
organized body - a criteria which is not met by a mere "biologically
integrated whole." Only a "psychologically integrated whole" can be an
ensouled human person (Bole, 1990). But what, for Bole, is a human
person?
To answer this, Bole (1990) moves into the philosophical arena, searching
historically for a philosophical system (or any parts of philosophical
systems) which would match the scientific arguments of Bedate and Cefalo.
I will not expand on his interesting historical search, other than to relay
Bole's conclusion, that a "person" is to be defined much as Engelhardt has
defined a "person," i.e., as that which can:
17
...unify experiences as its own and reason about connections not only
between experiences and their unifying self and between action and goals,
but also about the connections between actions, whether to or by this person,
and the personal agent to be morally blamed or lauded for them. Such a
person might begin to be instanced in a young child who can use "I" and can
blame those who would injure it. (Engelhardt, 1985) (emphasis added)
Thus, convinced of the scientific arguments of Bedate and Cefalo, and
finding a "match" with the rationalistic philosophy of Engelhardt, Bole
concludes that the term "person" would be applied to competent adults, and
younger human beings who can sufficiently use languages, i.e., "can unify
their experiences in self-consciousness as their own, and reason about
connections between actions and ends." A fetus or a normal young infant is
only a biologically integrated whole. They are not "persons." They are only
"substances." And a human zygote is not even a human substance -
although, he claims, that it is a human being (Bole, 1990).
Without going through all of the philosophical details, it is important at this
point for the scientific community to understand what is at stake, i.e., what
are the conceptual and very real consequences when a human "person" is
defined only in terms of reason or "rational attributes," such as is found in
Bole (1989, 1990), Engelhardt (1985), Singer (1981, 1985, 1989), Kuhse
(1985, 1986), and Tooley (1974). If only a "person" is due moral, social and
legal protections and priviledges, and if a "person" is defined only in terms
of the actual exercising of "rational attributes," then the majority of human
beings are not persons, and therefore are not protected. That is, the mentally
infirm, drunks, alcoholics, drug addicts, Alzheimers and Parkinsons patients,
stroke victims, the depressed, etc. are not "persons," and therefore bear no
moral, social or legal rights or protections of their own. Even the killing of
normal healthy human infants and young children (infanticide) is morally
acceptable to these writers. As Singer, the animal rights theorist, has put it:
Now it must be admitted that these arguments [about abortion] apply to the
newborn baby as much as to the fetus. A week-old baby is not a rational and
self-conscious being, and there are many non-human animals whose
rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel pain (sentience),
and so on, exceed that of a human baby a week, a month, or even a year old.
If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it appears that
the newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a
chimpanzee. (Singer, 1981)
Such are the very real and serious consequences of accepting this
rationalistic definition of a human person.
Finally, Bole will also redefine some important embryological terms, based
on the science of Bedate and Cefalo. By the term "zygote" he will now refer
18
to the product of fertilization to 14 days. Before 14 days the "zygote" is not
a human being, since it is not a "biologically integrated whole." The term
"embryo" he reserves for the entity from 2-8 weeks. I have to wonder how
many embryologists would agree with Bole's new biological nomenclature.
Given the apparent incorrectness of the scientific arguments of Bedate and
Cefalo, and the massive inadequacies in the "matching" rationalistic
philosophical definition of a human "person," can Bole's arguments or
distinctions hold up?
Wallace: "Based on recent research in reproductive biology, especially on
studies of cell division, twinning, recombination and implantation," Wallace
(1989), a physicist, also sees a need to up-date the scientific foundations of a
scholastic philosophy of nature which can account for ensoulment (often
placed at about 3 months). I would argue that Wallace sees a parallel
between McCormick's "pre-embryo" which seems to be in transition to
becoming a "person" at 14 days, and what the scholastics called a "being on
the way," or a "seed." I will present his scholastic philosophical concepts
and arguments only long enough to be able to pull out a few of the incorrect
scientific claims and invalid scientific analogies which he uses to make his
point. Wallace, who is a physicist and a scholastic philosopher, will attempt
his own redefinition of human embryogenesis.
One philosophical comment is in order to clarify Wallace's (and others')
concern about "ensoulment." If the "soul" is considered as a whole thing
itself (i.e., a substance or a being), then a theory of "delayed hominization"
(delayed "personhood") is necessary to explain how all the different and
separate component substances of a human being get put together serially
somewhere down the line (an example of a mind/body split). However, if
the "soul" is considered as only a principle, a power, or as a part of only one
whole thing, and if the vegetative and sensitive powers of the soul cannot be
separated from the rational powers but are contained in it virtually, then
there is simply no need for a theory of delayed hominization. Instead, a
theory of immediate hominization (immediate "personhood" at syngamy) is
necessary. I point this out because, interestingly, Wallace's and others'
rationalistic philosophical commitment requires the kind of "science" such
as reported by Bedate, Cefalo, Grobstein and McCormick. Is it possible that
these philosophical presuppositions are imposed on the scientific data? (The
subject of another paper.)
Wallace's project is roughly the following. First he will describe what he
calls stable natures: inorganic materials, plants, animals and finally human
beings. These descriptions, he says, are true only of the mature individuals -
not of those individuals as they were being generated. Second he will
describe what he calls transient natures, such as radioisotopes. It is the
model-concept of these immature transient natures which he will use to
redefine human embryogenesis. Each of the grades of stable natures will be
19
considered (invalidly) like a transient nature during the process of human
embryogenesis. They will be successively "educed" from the "protomatter"
of the previous transient nature (which has eventually become stablized).
This is how it works.
The "mature" stable natures are exemplified by the following. First, an
inorganic nature, (a chemical element, a compound, or a mineral) is an
organizing field, a force which structures "protomatter" and gives it certain
qualities and powers. Second, a plant nature contains these inorganic
powers, as well as its own vegetative powers, such as, nutrition, growth,
reproduction and homeostasis. It is the growth power which is the
developmental power, controlling cell growth and differentiation. Third, an
animal nature contains the two previous powers, plus its own, like the
powers of sensation and emotion. All of these lower forms are educed from
"protomatter" by angelic activity and are material forms. Fourth, the human
form, being immaterial, is created by God, with the powers of intellect and
will. These human powers do not need any body organs through which to
operate.
The "transient" natures he will describe will "explain the efficient causality
we observe during fetal development." He likens these transient natures to
the "seeds" which so puzzled the medieval scholastics. He calls these
natures "transient" because they have only fleeting or transitory existence.
Also of importance is how these "transient natures" are generated (which he
will also liken to fetal development). "Transient natures" are generated
through an "eduction" of a form from something which contains many forms
potentially; then it will receed back into the "protomatter," and be replaced
by another form which will be "educed." When this happens, he explains,
substantial - not accidental -change has taken place. For example, there is
the generation of compounds from elements. Na and Cl combine to form
NaCl. When they so combine, Wallace claims, the Na and the Cl have
actually changed their natures, and have become a third nature - i.e., NaCl.
Thus in the formation of elemental compounds, "when the new nature is
generated the old nature ceases to be." He will use this "model" analogously
to argue for delayed hominization. That is, during early embryogenesis,
there is literally substantial change taking place - i.e., a change in natures.
First there develops a human "vegetative" substance or nature, replaced by a
human "sensitive" (or animal) substance or nature - which is finally replaced
by a human "rational" substance or nature.
However, when the reverse of such a process is explained - the
decomposition of water -Wallace himself is puzzled. Why does the
decomposition of water result in two hydrogens? This poses the probem of
"individuation" to him (Wallace is puzzled because his philosophical
definition of "natures" consists only of the universal "species" form, and
thus it can not explain the materiality of the individuals which comprise the
20
"species"). So he trys to liken the two hydrogens to identical twins - but
cannot resolve the puzzle, if theoretically what is generated is the universal
"species" only. He will not let this theoretical problem daunt him, however,
and takes refuge in what he considers to be a chemist's response. "For
chemists it is sufficient to consider the nature apart from the individual,
since in their view all hydrogen molecules are necessarily the same"
(emphasis added). So Wallace is free now to consider only the nature, apart
from the material individuals - a prerequisite, interestingly enough, for a
theory of delayed hominization.
Wallace's next example of a transient nature comes from radiochemistry. He
describes the radioactive decay of one element into another. And like the
human embryo, he claims, the parent isotope is "self-activating." Here, each
of the daughter isotopes is successively "educed" from within the potency of
the parent isotope. Although he thinks that this model of radiochemistry is
really descriptive of a stable nature, he states that he will "consider" it as a
transient nature anyway, because it is useful to explain human
embryogenesis.
And finally, Wallace will apply his model of "transient natures" - based on
recent research in reproductive biology - to describe his own theory of
human embryogenesis, or the serial generation of a plant, to an animal, and
finally to a human being. Wallace's description of human embryogenesis
involves a constant progression from a transient nature to the stable form of
that nature, from which is educed the next transient nature which likewise
persists until the stable form of that nature appears, etc.
First, then, human embryogenesis begins with the seeds (ovum and sperm)
of the human parents. These seeds combine to form an entity with a "plantlike"
transient nature [he means the human zygote]. "When material defects
are eliminated and twinning or recombination can no longer occur," a new
stable-like plant form is educed from the potentiality of the "protomatter,"
with its own proper "plant" powers. This stable plant form persists until a
new transient animal-like form is educed. Again, when material defects are
eliminated and twinning or recombination can no longer occur, the new
stable animal form with its proper powers is educed. Finally, when this
animal "matter" is appropriately organized by the animal form, God creates
the immaterial human form (i.e., the "rational" soul alone) with its own
proper powers - and we now have a human being with human ensoulment
completed (i.e., a human "person").
The problems with Wallace's redefinition of human embryogenesis are both
conceptual and scientific. I will list but a few.
1. Empirically there is no such thing as two kinds of natures of one and
the same specific kind of thing. That is, there is no such thing as a
21
"transient" nature and a "stable" nature of a plant or of an animal -
nor of a human being. One only has to check the chromosomes to
determine that. An acorn is genetically an oak - albeit a tiny one.
That is why it can grow into the stage of a large oak tree, instead of
becoming a pumpkin.
2. It is invalid for Wallace to claim that there is an analogy between
"stable" natures which are descriptive of mature individuals only,
and his serial "phases" of "transient" natures during the immature
stages of human embryogenesis. After going through his paradigm
example of a "transient" nature, Wallace will then admit that a
radioisotope is probably really an example of a "stable" nature -but
he will use it anyway as a "model" of his so-called "transient"
natures during human embryogenesis. If it is really a "stable" nature,
how can he legitimately use it as a substitute "transient" nature in his
model of human embryogenesis? He even admits the inconsistency,
but decides to use the analogy anyway, without any argument - other
than that it is "useful."
3. Relatedly, if the "rational" human nature which is infused at about 3
months is actually descriptive of a "mature" human nature, would
Wallace then agree that a three month fetus which was receiving this
mature human nature was actually a mature human being?
4. Simply because Wallace's "transient" natures (radioisotopes) have a
"brief" existence does not mean therefore that they are not stable
natures. An existent is an existent - no matter how briefly it exists.
5. As a chemist, I cannot imagine any other chemist who would agree
with Wallace that Na and Cl actually change their very natures when
they form a compound. There is only the sharing of electrons - not
protons. Nor would a chemist agree that all hydrogens are the same;
chemists know about natural isotopes. The atomic weights given in
the periodic chart are only an average weight for the elements. Nor
would they accept Wallace's analogy between the generation of
"daughter" isotopes from radioactive "parents," and the generation of
a human zygote from two human parents. The radioactive "daughter"
is a different "species" than the "parent"; the human zygote has the
same number of chromosomes as the human parents and is of the
same species.
6. Wallace invalidly compares and equates several different scientific
terms and processes. For example, the "nuclei" of a radioisotope and
that of a plant, an animal, or a human cell are hardly equivalent. Nor
is the "generation" of any of those entities equivalent. He also uses
an incorrect analogy between a plant "seed" and human "seeds" (the
ovum and the sperm). A plant seed already contains all of the
reproductive information it needs to develop; a human ovum or
sperm contains only half of the necessary information. Thus if only a
sperm or only an ovum were implanted in a womb, no human being
would ever result from it. The more correct empirical correlate,
22
actually, would be between the plant seed and the human zygote
after syngamy.
Wallace made a critical observation during his paper which might have kept
him out of the above difficulties. He noted one of the classic insights of both
bench research science and of a realistic philosophy of nature: "a quality is
an attribute through which we come to know a nature. A thing's actions and
reactions enable us to ascertain its powers and from these we judge its
nature." Every bench researcher, I would argue, is quite familiar with this
truth of basic research.
Had Wallace only adhered to his own astute observation it would have
precluded him from developing his model of "transient" natures which he
wanted to use to explain human embryogenesis. For if one looks hard at the
most agreed upon scientific evidence which we do have, Wallace would
have had to argue for immediate hominization. Biologically we know that at
syngamy there is already a human being with "46" chromosomes; that
immediately there are specifically human enzymes and proteins produced
(not tomato or frog enzymes); that all of the information for cleavage,
totipotency, implantation, etc., is already present; and that by "3 months"
specifically human functions, reactions, tissue and organ formations have
already taken place. Empirically, the formation of cabbages or giraffe
tissues and organs has not taken place. There is, then, no need biologically
for a "rational soul" to be infused at three months to make it specifically
human and direct human formation. That work has already been done by
"something" back at the human zygote stage. The 3 month fetus doesn't need
a rational "soul" (which for rationalists doesn't even contain a vegetative or
a sensitive "soul") to make it something it already is - a human being which
is functioning humanly. This biology would enable us to ascertain its human
nature and would argue for immediate hominization. It compells us to reject
a real mind/body split.
II. Philosophy/Theology/Biomedical Ethics: "Later" Fetal Development
Although the above writers have used scientific facts concerning cell
differentiation, implantation, twinning, etc., as either an argument against
syngamy or for the "earlier" marker events of "personhood," the remaining
commentators have abandoned these early stages as being insignificant.
Instead they will use scientific data to argue for some sort of brain-related
marker, based on the later stages of human embryogenesis. Regardless if
they will argue that "personhood" requires the presence of "rational
attributes," or sentience (the ability to feel pain), the focus of their
arguments is the physiological substrate which they claim is the precondition
for either of those characteristics of personhood.
All of these writers have several problems in common, so for brevity I will
23
state these beforehand, as they apply to all of the writers generally (see
Irving, 1991).
First, many will still actually define a human "person" in terms of "rational
attributes" only. But as pointed out above, this is a very rationalistic
definition drawn from a philosophical theory with a mind/body split. Thus
there can be no interaction between the physiological substrate for which
they argue and the "rational attributes" which those physiological substrates
are suppose to be supporting. Others will define a human "person" in terms
of "sentience" only. But this is a very materialistic definition drawn from a
philosophical school of thought which also has very serious theoretical
problems of its own. Nowhere do these writers either acknowledge their
own philosophical presuppositions or argue for their respective definitions
of a human being or a human person.
Second, the physiological substrate which is a precondition for the
physiological substrate for either "rational attributes" or for sentience is the
human zygote itself.
Third, in none of their markers is there any real "personal" functioning at all.
These stages are all immature stages, and as other writers have indicated,
"full consciousness" or "full physiological integration" or sentience is not
complete until well after birth. All of these arguments, then, are arguments
from "potential."
Fourth, the scientific evidence for these claims is still very sketchy, vague
and controversial. Many scientific critics indicate a reading into the
scientific evidence more than is either physiologically or conceptually
possible.
Fifth, conceptual parallels are often made on which to base distinctions, like
the evolution theory or the criteria of "brain death." None of these parallels
are argued for but are simply posited. Only the similarities are noted; the
differences, which could actually contradict the existence of any such
"parallels," are ignored.
As a quick survey of the literature reveals, one of the writers who argues for
brain-related criteria is MacKay (see Jones, 1989). The maturation of the
nervous system is the significant stage (before that point there is only a "no
one" there). Rahner, Ruff, and Haring (see Jones, 1989) claim that the
evolution of "persons" parallels the evolution of the cosmos. That is, there is
a major leap in embryogenesis with the "evolution" of the cerebral cortex at
about 20-45 days. Several British writers (see Jones, 1989) argue for 40
days with the functioning of the nerve net. This point, they state, parallels
"brain death," implying that "consciousness" is the defining characteristic of
a human person. Humans are to be defined in terms of a nature able to
24
exercise rational, moral and personal capacities. Since the first moments of
the conscious experience is the basis for later rational and moral thought,
they claim, these conscious experiences are dependent on the development
of a functioning nerve net. Sass (1989) argues for 54 days - what he calls
"brain birth," or Cortical Life I (his parallel to "brain death"). He bases his
position on its compatibility with the medical understanding and explanation
of the process of human embryonic development and gestation. Singer and
Wells (see Jones, 1989) argue for 6 weeks, because consciousness,
autonomy and rationality are morally relevant characteristics, consciousness
being the most minimal. At 6 weeks a being is capable of feeling pleasure or
pain (sentience), or of having experiences and preferring some kinds of
experience to others. At that point the being has special moral status. And
Tauer (1985) argues that a "person" emerges with brain activity at about 7
weeks.
Several writers argue for the 8 week biological marker. Lockwood (1988)
and Goldenring (1982, 1985) see this stage as the starting point for human
"personal" existence because this is the point at which there is integration of
the brain as a whole. Goldenring considers this view persuasive because of
the symmetrical view it offers of the beginning and end of human existence,
and because of its objective basis. Kushner (1984) argues that consciousness
depends on the functioning of the brain at 8 weeks. Shea (1985) considers
this the time when the newly developing body organs and systems begin to
function as a whole under the direction of a functioning brain. Grobstein
(1985), in another article, also argues that at 8 weeks there is a person. He
states that the beginning of "life" is not significant, but rather the
manifestation of "self" (pace Engelhardt). Until 8 weeks, he argues, the
human embryo lacks the two essential aspects of personhood: affective
recognizability by other people, and internal conscious awareness. And
Gertler (see Singer, 1981) argues that 5 months is the proper marker, when
"brain birth" begins. Human cognition, he claims, is distinctive of "persons,"
and is indicated by the beginning of the formation of EEG waves in the
neocortex around 5 months. Bennett (1989) also argues for "brain life."
There is, however, no scientific evidence which demonstrates the correlation
of "consciousness" and the organizing of the nervous system, as pointed out,
for example, by the Board for Social Responsibility (1985) in London. And
many writers, such as Jones (1989), have argued that the parallelism
between brain death and brain life is invalid. Brain death, he points out, is
the gradual or rapid cessation of function of a brain. Brain birth is the very
gradual acquisition of a function of a developing neural system. Jones
argues that this developing neural system is not a brain. He also questions
the entire assumption, and asks what neurological reasons there might be for
concluding that an incapacity for consciousness becomes a capacity for
consciousness once this point is passed. Also, the nervous system of the
eight-week old fetus is quite different from that of the seven or eighth month
25
old fetus, let alone that of the two-year old child. The nervous system of the
eight week old fetus, Jones argues, is not a miniature version of the young
child's brain. It is very incomplete, and its functioning is at a different level
from that of the late fetus or young child. What follows from this, Jones
adds, is that at present it is impossible to recognize a distinct point of
transition from a "non-brain" to a "brain," or from a non-functioning
nervous system to a functioning one. He also argues that it is impossible to
recognize a distinct point of transition from a "non-person" to a "person."
Indeed, as Jones points out, all of these sorts of arguments are in fact
arguments from "potential" - arguments which these very writers are
suppose to be arguing against:
The second theme for some of the writers is the crucial part played by the
appearance of the cerebral cortex. The rationale for this is that it is the
cortex which, in the postnatal human, is central to higher thought processes.
While there is no denying that this is the case later on in life, the issue
during early gestation is whether the first appearance of cortical progenitors
signifies that the fetus has personhood or a personal center of life. The
features associated with personhood in postnatal life are only potentially
present in the eight week fetus; and so this stance relies upon the potentiality
argument. Surprisingly, though, this is not brought out by these writers.
Jones also examines the parallel that is made between these early neural
structures and sentience, or the capacity to feel pain. The earliest that
immature EEG activity can be obtained in very limited areas of the cerebral
hemispheres is 14 weeks. Even this responsiveness to pain is poorly
localized at this stage. This is problematic in that the initial time of electrical
activity appearing in the fetal brain is of an amorphous nature and thus
difficult to determine with precision. And with regard to pain, there is no
way of knowing whether a behavioral response we would experience as pain
is experienced in the same way by an early fetus with a rudimentary nervous
system. In view of these data, Jones concludes, it is difficult to have any
assurance that specific developmental stages can be associated with
concepts such as "differentiation" or "integration." Neither can one assert
that "there is 'conscious awareness' from the eighth-week stage onward."
Jones, himself, will argue for "brain-birth" at 6-7 months, a position which
would seem to be problematic too, given all of his own criticisms of
arguments from potentiality, the immaturity of the biological systems and
the dis-symmetry between the concepts of "brain death" and "brain birth."
The situation calls to mind the remarks of a different Jones' (1987)
concerning the role of the scientist in these disputes about fetal
"personhood":
The reproductive biologist cannot assign moral status to the sperm or the
egg or the fertilized egg or any of the subsequent products that may result
26
from this fusion... The reproductive biologist can help, however, by assuring
that other scientists or those who wish to assign a moral status - and use a
biological term or concept to do so - know what they are talking about.
(emphasis added)
What I have attempted to do in this paper up to this point is to question,
frankly, what some scientists are talking about - sincere though they may be.
Which scientists are correct, or at least have the best scientific theory to
support the empirical facts? I certainly do not consider myself an expert at
all, but surely what I see are basic problems concerning scientific facts
which are generally known and generally accepted as the best scientific
explanation within the scientific community itself. Scientific inaccuracies
may be undesirable within the field of science itself. Yet much of this
scientific misinformation - if it is incorrect - has proliferated throughout the
literature of philosophy, theology and biomedical ethics for many years.
This incorrect literature, in turn, has been institutionalized in philosophical,
theological and biomedical journals, text books, encyclopedias, and
computer programs on college campuses, "think tanks" and libraries
nationally as well as internationally. It has also been institutionalized in
public policy development, the topic to which I will now very briefly turn.
III. Public Policy Development
Any number of "institutional" policy makers are influenced by the scientific
and the bioethics literature - in most cases, legitimately so (Wikler, 1991;
Capron, 1989). But many are also influenced by the above apparent
inaccurate scientific/bioethics arguments, and inevitably incorporate these
scientific inaccuracies and redefinitions into public policies. I will only
touch on but a very few examples here.
The Harvard Medical School's (1968) definition of "brain death" - although
probably a medically legitimate and useful concept - was based on
neurological data similar to that discussed above, and is often the standard
used by physicians to make a determination of the death of the patient
before the withdrawal of treatment. "Brain death" statutes have now become
law in many states.
Similar neurological data is also used to make a diagnosis of "permanent
vegetative state" (PVS), a process which either has already been or, it is
argued, should be adopted as a medical standard (Washington State, 1992;
Council on Scientific Affairs, etc., 1990; Capron, 1992). Yet PVS is still a
questionable diagnosis (Steinbock, 1989; Ross, 1992; Tassaeau, 1991),
which can lead to decisions to withdraw life-sustaining medical therapy.
Such decisions to withdraw therapy are often justified by the rationalistic
philosophical claim that there is no longer a human "person" present
27
(Robertson, 1991).
Parallels of "brain death" with "brain birth" are made, leading to demands to
forego medical treatment to defective neonates and newborns - since they
also are not "persons." This is especially true for newborns with
anencephaly (a diagnosis which is also difficult and questionable,
designating a cluster of symptoms which differ significantly). The parents of
these infants receive many requests to donate the fresh living organs of their
infants. Walters (1992) argues for the medical standard of "proximate
personhood" for making difficult treatment decisions involving imperiled
newborns. A developing individual's right to life, he claims, increases "as he
or she approaches the threshhold of undisputed human personhood."
Anencephalics, because of their nature, may be treated "primarily (but not
only) as a means" - especially when balanced against the good they may
bring to others - i.e., as donors of organs (Walters, 1989) - a non-neutral and
normative utilitarian theory of ethics. And in a different context,
reminescent of Descartes, many neonatal and pediatric surgeons have
withheld pain relief from neonates and infants during and after surgery
partly because of their belief that they cannot feel pain at those
developmental stages.
There are also charges growing that Roe v Wade was grounded in incorrect
science (Carberry and Kmiec,1992). Other legal commentators, (Annas -
1989-A; 1989-B), in defending Roe, follow the "symbolic personhood"
arguments of Robertson (1988, 1989, 1991) - (which in turn relies heavily
on the science of Grobstein). Annas agrees with the Roe decision which held
that "a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its
regulation of abortion," and so opposes the Webster decision, which stated
that "the life of each human being begins at conception." But legitimate
arguments can be made empirically that the life of each individual human
being does begin at fertilization. This is not a case of imposing one person's
or group's "theories" on the rest of us - it is an objective, empirical fact.
Scientifically, even the "best fit" theory has to go with fertilization. As
Moore has put it: "This cell [the zygote] results from fertilization of an
oocyte, or ovum, by a sperm, or spermatozoon, and is the beginning of a
human being" (Moore, 1982, p. 1; emphasis of the author). Is science
prepared to state that this is scientifically not true?
The advent of in vitro fertilization has led to other policy arguments and
policy decisions, on both the medical and the legal level. The American
Fertility Society has adopted the term "pre-embryo" in their professional
quidelines. Physicians have developed policies for the implantation, freezestorage
and experimental destruction of IVF human embryos - who, it is
often argued, are not human beings or human "persons." Legal precedent is
set in the courts in cases involving surrogate motherhood (Annas, 1991),
determination of decisions in the cases of the death of the "biological
28
parents, and "ownership" of unwanted frozen embryos (Robertson, 1989).
Robertson (1986) argues in legal journals for new public policy
determinations on IVF human embryos - quoting at length Grobstein's
theory of human embryogenesis. Robertson agrees with Grobstein that the
"pre-embryo" is not a "person" yet, and thus possesses no moral or legal
rights. Robertson (1986) considers the pre-embryo as only property and
having only "symbolic value" to the parents. In the following quote from
Robertson, arguing in the area of legal and public policy development, the
reliance on the science of Grobstein, as well as the very rationalistic
understanding of the philosophical term "potential" can be identified, and
are quite confusing:
... consideration of embryo status is essential if we are to think clearly about
and adopt appropriate policies concerning IVF and embryo manipulation...
To assign a moral and legal status to the extracorporeal embryo, we must
first examine the facts of early embryo development [which he then proceeds
to quote from Grobstein].
[The early human embryo is] clearly not a person in the usual sense that we
use the term person... [It] is similar to blood, bone marrow and other tissue
or even solid organs, though there are important differences.
...Does the potential to become a person confer a particular moral and legal
status on the embryo, a status that entails duties that limit what might be
done with extracorporeal embryos?... I argue that the embryo does not have
a moral status in and of itself.
...It is clear that there is no obligation to transfer embryos based on
obligations to the persons who might then be born. Future persons [i.e., IVF
human embryos] have no claim on us unless our present choices will affect
their well-being when they do come into being. If they never come into
being, they have not been harmed, since no person has ever existed to be
harmed. Thus there is no obligation to the person who might come into
being as a result of transfer, because there is no such person. No person
exists to whom an obligation can be owed... Nor is there an obligation to the
embryo in and of itself to be transferred, so that it might have the chance of
realizing its potential personhood. To say there is such a duty would be to
assume that the nontransferred pre-embryo is a rights-bearing entity in and
of itself. It might become such an entity if certain favorable conditions and
events occur. But the potential to become a person does not mean that an
entity should be treated as a person now, anymore than an acorn's potential
to become an oak tree means that it now be regarded as an oak tree... Indeed
such treatment would be very difficult in light of the biology of the embryo...
It has no interests, and thus cannot be the subject of moral duties at this
rudimentary stage [and thus can be used in experimental research].
29
(Robertson, 1986) (emphasis added)
The use of IVF human embryos for research purposes, of course, is a major
biomedical issue (Cefalo, 1991). Medical researchers lobby Congress and
federal regulatory committees to use "surplus" (Muggleton-Harris, 1991) or
produced-for-research IVF human embryos in a great number of basic
(destructive) research to perfect the IVF technique itself (see Aragona,
1991), improve embryonic cell biopsy, egg freezing techniques,
superovulation and chrorionic biopsy techniques, embryonic sex selection
and micro-injection techniques, as well as to screen viruses and bacteria.
IVF human embryos are also useful for research in fetal tissue transplants,
selective breeding of human beings, genome analysis and germ line gene
therapy, improvement of gene therapy techniques, nucleus substitition,
implantation and gestation of the human embryo in the uterus of another
animal and vice versa, production of new kinds of animals, creation of
human embryos from the sperm of two different individuals or the ova of
two different individuals, fusion of human embryos with other human
embryos or animals to create chimeras, and parthenogenesis experiments.
They are also useful for drug testing, product testing, commercial purposes
(hormones, blood proteins, anti-viral, anti-bacterial or anti-carcinogenic
agents, vaccines, recombinant DNA experiments, and biological warfare
experiments (Irving, 1991). Can such large scale medical research be
justified on the basis of the scientific and philosophical inaccuracies and
problem as addressed above?
Many of these scientific, medical and legal conclusions and policies find
their way to other national and international policy levels. For example, the
use of human embryos and fetuses in purely experimental research is often
justified on what at least the realist would consider the misperception of the
non-personhood of the human embryo and the human fetus, and the legal
reality of the Roe v Wade decision in the Supreme Court (NIH, 1988;
Annas, 1989, 1991; Robertson, 1989, 1991). International commissions pick
up on national policy precedents. Some Australian and French committees
argue for "produced for research IVF embryos." The Warnock Commission
in England (1984) concluded that only after 14 days should the human
embryo be afforded protection, because that is the limit of the period during
which it is possible for the human embryo to implant in the uterine wall,
after which the primitive streak is formed, and after which, they state,
twinning does not occur. Before 14 days the human embryo can be used for
experimental research, since it is not a human being or a human person. This
conclusion was reached even though there was a common ground among the
Warnock Committee members that at such time as it has become
indisputably a living human being or person, "it would be morally
unthinkable to carry out on the human organism, without consent,
experiments of a damaging or mutilating kind" (Lockwood, 1988). On the
issue of PVS, the CCNE (French National Ethics Committee, 1986)
30
affirmed that patients in a "permanent vegetative state" constitute
"intermediaries between human beings and animals" - a view perhaps
consonant with a Wallace-type scholastic philosophy - but one which is
contested by Verspieren (Tassaeau, 1991) of the Centre Sevres, Paris,
operating from a different philosophical definition of a human person.
DISCUSSION
Such are a few of the theoretical and practical influences which some of the
seemingly basic scientific inaccuracies have had on other fields. Perhaps
what I have naively perceived as "incorrect" science is actually an erroneous
judgment on my part. If such is the case, I am certainly not alone, and the
scientific community would well-serve those of us in other fields by
clarifying for us which theories of human biochemistry, human genetics,
human molecular biology and human embryological development "best fit"
the scientific data. The need for clarity is important, as complex decisions in
other fields can go one way or another, depending on which scientific theory
is perceived as the best explanation of the scientific facts.
To parlay this into the "if...then" language of philosophy, IF IT IS TRUE:
that the human zygote does not have all of the genetic information it needs
to develop; that it is not a human being; that information from the mother
determines the process of differentiation; that it does not possess the
information needed for developing past the blastocyst stage; that
hydatidiform moles and teratomas proceed from normal human zygotes; that
all of the cells from the trophoblast layer are discarded after birth; that no
twinning takes place after 14 days; that before that point there is no
individual; that all of the genetic input is complete only at the 2-cell stage;
that differentiation is completed by the 14-day stage; that analogies between
transient and stable natures, between the "nuclei" of radioisotopes, plants,
animals and humans, between the generations of radioisotopes, plants,
animals and humans, and between the causality of radioisotope "daughters"
and human gametes can be validly and soundly made; that chemists consider
all atoms of an element to be identical and that they don't consider the
individual atoms; that parallels between brain death and brain birth,
sentience and pain, consciousness or self-consciousness and "rational
attributes," immature nerve nets and adult whole brain integration can be
validly and soundly made ---------
THEN it is true that there is present no human organism, or human being, or
human "person" at syngamy or before certain biological "marker events of
personhood." If that is true, then there is no entity bearing any moral or legal
rights of its own. If that is true, then early human embryos and fetuses may
be used in a myriad of experimental research protocols, frozen and thawed
with no personal or legal concern for damages, declared as property in the
court rooms, aborted and harvested for organs or tissues. To be both
31
logically and "realistically" consistent, one would have to argue the same
fate for normal healthy infants and young children (not to mention those of
us who are not so "normal") - because both real "rational attributes" and real
sentience and full brain organization are not complete until well after
childhood.
This same logic must hold at the other end of the life-spectrum. The "souls"
or "properties" of persons disappear one by one in the reverse order from
whence they came: first the "rational," then the "sensitive" - and finally we
are left with a "something" which is senile or in a "permanent vegetative
state." If this "something" is now not a person, then it is probably ethical to
experiment on it, medical treatment should be removed and/or ceased - and
organ transplantation could begin.
If this science and logic is true, then it should certainly be compiled into
journal articles, text books, encyclopedias, encoded in professional medical
standards, become hospital policy, be translated into state and federal
statues, and be processed through Congressional hearings and court rooms.
Finally, it should be acted on "uniformly" by national commissions and
regulatory agencies - and once so institutionalized, it should be considered
as a "precedent" for other international bodies to adopt as well.
IF IT IS NOT TRUE: if the product of syngamy during human fertilization
is a living, individual human being who must simultaneously be a human
person; if specifically human functions, proteins and enzymes are observed
and produced from the zygote-stage on; if specifically human tissue and
organ systems are continuously produced from the zygote-stage on; if all of
the processes and stages of human embryogenesis are directly and
completely encoded in the original human zygote (including the 2-cell and
blastocyst stages, as well as totipotency, differentiation, nerve-net and whole
brain formation - sometimes even twinning); if methylation and the
cascading effect are properly documented and understood; if hydatidiform
moles and teratomas do not proceed from normal human embryos; if
twinning does take place after 14 days; if differentiation, the attainment of
"rational attributes" or of sentience is not complete until at least early
adulthood; if there are profound differences between the "nuclei" of
radioisotopes, plants animals and humans, between the generation of
radioisotopes, plants, animals and humans, and between the causality of
radioisotope "daughters" and human gametes; if there are natural isotopes of
most of the elements in the periodic table, and chemists are concerned with
individual atoms; if "models" of transient natures do not equal real human
embryogenesis; if there is no real scientifically demonstrated parallel
between brain death and brain life, nerve nets and whole brains,
consciousness, self-consciousness and sentience, and between immature and
mature capacities --------
32
THEN it is true that there is no distinction between a human being and a
human person which is empirically verifiable (or philosophically
defensable). If this is true, then a human zygote or a human fetus is a human
being and a human person which is the bearer of his or her own moral and
legal rights. If that is true, then should they be used in purely experimental
protocols, damaged by freezing and thawing, depicted as property in our
court rooms, harvested for organs or tissues? Infanticide, experimentation on
the senile or on patients in a "permanent vegetative state," and the
withholding and withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treatment (unless
for the direct benefit of that person) would be morally unacceptable. If this
science is correct, then it would be reasonable for it to be compiled into
journal articles, text books and encyclopedias, and different policies should
be adopted in professional medical codes, hospital policies, state and federal
statues; processed before Congressional hearings and court rooms; and
institutionalized in national and international regulations.
CONCLUSION
So which scientific data and theories of nuclear chemistry, human
biochemistry, human genetics, human molecular biology and human
embryology best explain the empirical data? Non-scientists cannot sort out
the accuracy and reliability of these contradictory scientific claims.
I have attempted in this paper to draw attention to the fact that scientific
inaccuracies - even in considering only one current issue - have apparently
"cascaded" throughout a number of other seemingly unrelated fields,
influencing their theoretical superstructures and at least partially
determining the development of public policy. Aristotle's addage rings true -
a small error in the beginning leads to a multitude of errors in the end. Both
kinds of scientific theories addressed here cannot both be correct and true.
Each one leads to a set of different conclusions when used by theorists in
other fields.
Perhaps most scientists have little time or interest to worry about such
things. Or perhaps he or she remains basically unaware of what happens to
the data and theories once they have been submitted - other than for
specifically scientific purposes. I hope that this discussion may to some
degree indicate how their data and theories can strongly influence other
fields, and I would encourage scientists to consider, investigate, and discuss
how they may help us sort it out.
NOTES
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